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LABOR

Employer Speech Protected by Section 8(c)

Allegations of unfair labor practices frequently present the National
Labor Relations Board' and the courts' with the problem of balancing the
rights of employers against the rights of employees. This conflict is especially apparent in union organization campaigns. 3 The right of the employer to express views in opposition to union organization' may clash with
the right of the employees to organize 5 free from employer coercion., Since
both of these interests are protected by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), a balance must be struck. The Fourth Circuit faced this conflict
between the section 7 right of employees to organize and the section 8(c)
right of the employer to communicate his opposition to union organization
in L.S. Ayres & Co. v. NLRB.7
In Ayres, employees of L.S. Ayres & Co. attempted to establish a union
at the employer's plant. Shortly before an election was held to determine
I The power of the National Labor Relations Board to hear unfair labor practice cases is
conferred by National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
2NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), provides for review of the findings of the Board
by the circuit court upon petition of the aggrieved party.
3See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in RepresentativeElections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bok].
An employer is free to express his views and opinions, written or verbally, as long as
his statement "contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." NLRA § 8(c), 29
U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970). A statement containing a threat or promise is not protected by the
Act. See generally Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 25 MD. L. REv. 111, 112 (1965); Symposium-Restrictions on the Employer's Right of
Free Speech During Organizing Campaignsand Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 40
(1968).
5 NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), grants employees
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activites for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and [employees] shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities ....
' An employer has committed an unfair labor practice if he interferes with organizational
and bargaining rights guaranteed to employees by NLRA § 7. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1970). A significant portion of the law under § 8(a)(1) developed as a result of
employer conduct during union organizational campaigns. See generally Bok, supra note 3.
When the Board finds that an unfair labor practice has been committed it issues an order
requiring remedy of the problem. NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Usually the order
requires the party in violation to cease and desist from unfair conduct. Id. Where employee
discharges are involved, the Board may order reinstatement of employees along with an award
of back pay. Id. If the unfair labor practice involves the failure to a party to bargain collectively, the Board may issue a bargaining order requiring that party to bargain in good faith.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969). Orders of the Board are similar
to injunctions, NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941), and must be
obeyed by the violating party. As in judicial proceedings, a violating party may be found in
contempt for failure to obey a Board order. See NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner Inc., 414
F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1969).
7 551 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1977).
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if the employees would be represented by a union, several coercive statements were made by supervisory personnel promising a wage increase if the
union was defeated and threatening retaliation in the event of a union
victory." In addition, the plant superintendent delivered a speech in which
he described the consequences which could result if an employee signed a
union authorization card.0 The superintendent's prepared speech contained no obvious threats and purported to be informative rather than
coercive. Nevertheless, the union filed a complaint with the Board alleging
that the speech, as well as the statements by supervisory personnel, constituted an unfair labor practice.' 0 The Board found that the coercive statements of supervisory personnel" "singly and collectively" were unfair labor
practices because the statements interfered with the employees' right to
select a union.' 2 The Board also found that the prepared text of the superintendent's speech violated section 8(a)(1).' 3 The speech,'4 considered in
conjunction with the employer's general animosity towards the union and
the unfair labor practices resulting from the coercive statements, allowed
the Board to infer that the employees would interpret the speech as a
threat against their signing the authorization cards.'" Furthermore, the
Board found that the superintendent had deviated from the prepared text
in his actual speech.'" In this extemporaneous portion of his speech, the
Id. at 587. Supervisory personnel told certain employees that they could be replaced if
they voted for the union. One pro-union employee "was asked how she could support her
family without a job." Id. at 587 n.1. In addition, another pro-union employee "was asked
how it would be if she went to the parking lot and found her car burned up." Id. These
statements, in conjunction with a promised wage increase contingent upon the union's defeat,
indicate the degree of animosity which the employer felt towards the union. Id.
I Id. at 589. Unions often will solicit employee support by having employees sign a card
indicating their desire to be represented by a union. Id. The text of the superintendent's
speech noted that the signing of a union authorization card subjects the employees ".to all
the obligations of Union membership, including paying union dues, fines, and assessments,
obeying strike orders and doing picket line duty." Id. The superintendent also indicated that
if the union procured the signatures of a majority of the employees on union authorization
cards, the union could petition the National Labor Relations Board for recognition as the
employees' bargaining agent. Id. Furthermore, if the union did petition the Board, the superintendent asserted that the employees who signed cards could be subpoenaed to testify as to
the validity of their signatures and "the circumstances under which the card was signed."
Id. Thus, the superintendent stated that the normal procedure for determining upon representation by a secret vote of employees could be bypassed and employees could be involved
in legal proceedings before the Board. Id.
, 551 F.2d at 587; see note 6 supra.
" See note 8 supra.
" 551 F.2d at 587 n.1. The statements by supervisory personnel were not protected by §
8(c) of the NLRA because of their threatening character. In addition, because the statements
included a promise of a wage increase in the event of a union defeat, they were not protected.
See note 4 supra. Because these statements interfered with the employees' § 7 rights, the
employer violated § 8(a)(1). See note 6 supra.
,3551 F.2d at 587.
" See note 9 supra.
,sL.S. Ayres & Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1344, 91 L.R.R.M. 1103, 1104 (1976).
, Id. at 1348, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1103.
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superintendent stated that "employees who signed union authorization
cards would be branded as troublemakers."' 7 The Board concluded that
this deviation was threatening to the employees and constituted an additional violation of section 8(a)(1).1" Accordingly, the Board ordered the
employer to cease and desist from committing unfair labor practices during
the union organizational campaign and required the employer to post a
notice indicating to employees the nature of the violations which occurred
and the remedy imposed by the Board.' 9
Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed the findings of the Board regarding the coercive statements made by supervisory personnel, the court held
that the superintendent's speech did not constitute an unfair labor practice.2 0 The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the statments of
the employer to his employees were protected by section 8(c) of the NLRA.
Section 8(c) provides that an employer's speech will not constitute an
unfair labor practice so long as the speech contains no threats of reprisal
for pro-union activities or promises of benefit for anti-union activities.2 '
The court found that the statements made by supervisory personnel were
obviously threatening and promissory and thus not protected by section
8(c) .22 The superintendent's speech, however, did not contain an obvious
threat or promise. 2 Because of the informative nature of the speech, the
court had to distinguish between statements which are predictions and
statements which are threats in determining whether the speech was protected. 24 A statement is a threat if the consequences forecasted in the
statement are within the employer's control or if the forecasted consequences "have no basis in objective fact." 2 In Ayres, the Fourth Circuit
" Id. at 1348 n.2.
" Id. at 1348, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1104. The dissenting Board member argued, however, that
but for the deviation, the speech would have been lawful. The dissent noted that the speech
"merely emphasized the seriousness of the card signing act by detailing the ways in which

the cards would be used." Id. at 1344, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1103 n.2.
" Id. at 1355; see note 6 supra.
11 551 F.2d at 587-88.
21 NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
2 551 F.2d at 587.
" Id. at 589; see note 9 supra.
24 Predictions are protected by § 8(c) while threats are not. See note 25 infra.
2 NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1971); see NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). In Lenkurt, the court found that the employer's
statement that cheaper paper might be used in the printing shop was a prediction made in
response to the possibility of increased wage demands following unionization. The court,
however, cautioned that "an employer may not impliedly threaten retaliatory consequences
within his control, nor may he, in an excess of imagination and under the guise of prediction,
fabricate hobgoblin consequences outside his control which have no basis in objective in fact."
438 F.2d at 1106; see Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1964) ("a
prediction that competitive conditions will force a plant to close if a union contract is signed
is protected, whereas a threat to close in retaliation to unionization is beyond the pale");
accord, NLRB v. Automative Controls Corp., 406 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1969). A statement
also can be threatening despite the mild form of the language used. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Stanton Enterprises, Inc., 351 F.2d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 1965).

1978]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

implied that the prepared text of the speech could constitute a threat
rather than a predication if the text inaccurately stated the significance
of signing an authorization card." Since no claim of inaccuracy was made
by the union," however, the Fourt Circuit, reversing the Board's determination, held that the prepared text of the speech was protected by section

8(c).28

In reaching its determination regarding the superintendent's speech,
the court did not indicate whether the accompanying unfair labor practices
had any effect on the characterization of the speech as protected or unpro551 F.2d at 558. If the employer's statement had inaccurately stated the significance
of signing an authorization card and the use which the union could make of such cards, then
the employer's statement may have had no basis in fact and could constitute a threat. See
NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1971). Speech which is apparently nonthreatening on its face and protected may lose its protection if the content of the
speech is proved to be an inaccurate representation of fact. 551 F.2d at 588. In addition,
departure from the prepared text of a speech may cause the speech to become unprotected if
the departure makes the entire speech threatening to employees. Id. at 587-88; see note 28
infra.
2 551 F.2d at 588.
21Id. The court, finding that substantial evidence did not support the Board's determination, also reversed the Board's conclusion that the superintendent had deviated from the
prepared text in delivering the speech to employees. Id. at 587-88. The sulstantial evidence
test is used by the circuit courts to review the Board's findings of fact. If the circuit court
determines that the Board's findings of fact in a particular case are supported by substantial
evidence, those findings are conclusive. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970); see Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951). If substantial evidence supports the
Board's findings, the appellate court cannot substitute its judgment "even though the court
would justifiably have made a different choice.
...
Id. at 488; see Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1360 (4th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Lester Bros., 337 F.2d 706, 708
(4th Cir. 1964).
The Fourth Circuit also dealt with two collateral issues in Ayres. Counsel for Ayres had
requested the sequestration of general counsel's witnesses in proceedings before the administrative law judge. The judge denied sequestration because he was not convinced that sequestration improved the quality of the evidence. 551 F.2d at 588. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
judge on the basis of a 1942 ruling which held that sequestration was a discretionary matter
for the Board and administrative law judges, NLRB v. Quality & Serv. Laundry, 131 F.2d
182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 775 (1942), and because the employer had not been
prejudiced by the denial of sequestration, 551 F.2d at 588. The court noted, however, that
FED. R. Ev[D. 615 provides for sequestration as a mattei of right. Nevertheless, the court
refused in Ayres to determine the extent to which Rule 615 is applicable to Board proceedings
under the NLRA § 10(b) requirement that those proceedings be conducted, "so far as practicable," in accordance with the rules of evidence. 551 F.2d at 588; see NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1970); NLRB v. Stark, 525 F.2d 422, 430 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976) (expressing strong preference for sequestration).
In addition, the Fourth Circuit disapproved of the administrative law judge's decision
to give the employees' testimony more credibility simply because the employees were in a
"vulnerable position." 551 F.2d at 588. The judge believed that the employees, fearing employer reprisal, would temper their adverse testimony. Id. The court stated that under NLRA
§ 8(a)(4), an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he "discharge[s] or otherwise
discriminate[s] against an employee" because the employee has filed unfair labor practice
charges or has given testimony in an unfair labor practice proceeding. NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970). Given this statutory protection for employees, the court held the
judge's practice to be unjustified. 551 F.2d at 588.
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tected. Prior to Ayres, the Fourth Circuit had formulated a two-tiered test
for examining speech. The employer's speech was examined initially to
determine whether it was threatening or promised a benefit thus making
the speech a per se violation of section 8(c) of the NLRA. 29 If the speech
did not constitute a per se violation, the speech was examined in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether these circumstances allowed a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit to be inferred
from the speech." Nevertheless, the mere coincidence of the speech and
other unfair labor practices did not mandate a finding that the speech was
unprotected." The Fourth Circuit's reliance on this circumstances test
prior to Ayres is in accord with the position of the other circuits.12 Among
the circumstances considered are the nature of the words of the speech, the
identity of the speaker, the place or means of conducting the speech,
whether the employer has expressed animosity towards the union, and
whether accompanying unfair labor practices have occurred.3 Thus, even
if the text of the speech is not threatening within the meaning of section
8(c), these courts will allow the accompanying circumstances to remove
the speech's protection if those circumstances taint the character of the
34
speech.
A contrary line of precedent interprets the language of NLRA section
8(c) literally and does not consider the surrounding circumstances.3 5 These
courts hold that a statement by an employer will not constitute an unfair
2 See, e.g., NLRB v. Tamper, Inc., 522 F.2d 781, 785-86 (4th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Holly
Farms Poultry Indus., Inc., 470 F.2d 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1972).
See NLRB v. Tamper, Inc., 522 F.2d 781, 786 (4th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Holly Farms
Poultry Indus., Inc., 470 F.2d 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Nu-Southern Dyeing &
Finishing, Inc., 444 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 435 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Greensboro Hosiery Mills, 398 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. KayserRoth Hosiery Co., 388 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1968).
31 See, e.g., NLRB v. Holly Farms Poultry Indus., Inc., 470 F.2d 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1972)
(no link between statement that serious harm would occur if the union was accepted and the
discharge of pro-union employees "other than that both occurred during a union organization
campaign"); NLRB v. Greensboro Hosiery Mills, 398 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1968) (isolated
§ 8(a)(1) violations did not prohibit protection of employer speech under § 8(c)); NLRB v.
Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., 388 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1968) (Sobeloff, J., concurring) (§
8(a)(1) violations were far enoughaemoved in time so as not to taint the speech).
3 See, e.g., R.J. Lallier Trucking v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1322, 1327 (8th Cir. 1977); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NLRB
v. Automotive Controls Corp., 406 F.2d 221, 223 (10th Cir. 1969); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 1967). Where the employer's statement is ambiguous
or the record shows a conflict as to what actually was said, the circumstances accompanying
a speech must be examined. See NLRB v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 453, 457 (8th
Cir. 1974).
13 E.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.
1974); NLRB v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 453, 457 (8th Cir. 1974).
31See, e.g., R.J. Lallier Trucking v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1322, 1327 (8th Cir. 1977).
* NLRB v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1962); see Truck Drivers & Helpers Local
No. 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 322
F.2d 89 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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labor practice if such expression does not contain a threat or promise of
benefit." Despite the minority of cases following this interpretation, the
precedent relied on by the Fourth Circuit in Ayres suggests the court's
acceptance of this literal interpretation of section 8(c).31 If the Ayres opin: See cases cited in note 35 supra; NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
The Ayres court cited Lundy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), as controlling. In Lundy, the employer's speech indicated that he did not want a
union and was not going to have one. Lundy Packing Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 139, 143,91 L.R.R.M.
1586,1587 (1976). The dissenting Board member in Lundy noted that the employer had stated
that he would use only legal methods to achieve this objective. Id. at 140, 91 L.R.R.M. at
1588. Sometime after the employer's speech, however, the employer committed certain unfair
labor practices. These violations included refusal to allow the union to solicit employee
support, interrogation of employees, surveillance of union activity, and the unlawful discharge of union adherents. Id. at 143-56, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1587; see NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) & (3), 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3) (1970). The Fourth Circuit found the employer's speech in Lundy
protected despite the presence of other unfair labor practices. In making its determination,
the court simply noted that the employer's speech constituted protected speech. 549 F.2d at
301. The Lundy opinion relied on NLRB v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1962) and
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Threads, like Lundy, appeared to confine the § 8(c) examination to the speech itself and
the case has been cited as rejecting the surrounding circumstances test. See NLRB v. Aerovox
Corp., 435 F.2d 1208, 1211 (4th Cir. 1970) (Aerovox noted that the purported rejection of the
circumstances test in Threads was nullified in NLRB v. Greensboro Hosiery Mills, 398 F.2d
414 (4th Cir. 1968)). In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme Court
stated that the nature of the employment relationship and the tendency of employees to draw
implications from the employer's statements should be considered when balancing employer
and employee rights. Id. at 617. Nevertheless, the Court did reiterate the statutory rule that
the employer's statement is protected unless the communication contains a threat or promise
of benefit. Id. at 618. Thus, the Gissel opinion does not indicate clearly whether the circumstances accompanying the speech should be considered when examining the speech. The
Court did note, however, that a line must be drawn between protected and unprotected
speech, id. at 620, and that the vulnerability of employees must be considered when drawing
that line. Id. at 617. The Court also cautioned that the employer should not engage in
"brinkmanship" by presenting a speech which could be interpreted as a threat by employees.
Id. at 620. Thus, where the employer's speech clearly does not constitute a threat of reprisal
or promise of benefit the speech will be protected. NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
Where the character of the speech is questionable, however, the tendency of employees to
infer threats from the employer's questionable language, 395 U.S. at 617, will operate to
remove the speech from § 8(c) protection. Id. at 620. Regardless of whether the speech is
questionable, courts only need to examine the speech and the surrounding circumstances will
not be considered. See NLRB v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 494 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 964 (1974).
The difficulty with the Ayres court's reliance on Lundy is that Lundy does not indicate
the reasoning process which the court followed in determining that the employer's speech was
protected. The Lundy opinion did not mention any of the Fourth Circuit § 8(c) decisions
which intervened between Threads and Lundy. See cases cited in supra note 30. These
inLervening cases stand for the proposition that the accompanying circumstances can taint
the character of a speech, yet the Lundy opinion did not indicate whether the accompanying
unfair labor practices were taken into consideration in holding the speech protected. In
addition, the effect of Threads is lessened by these later decisions. Finally, the Supreme
Court's holding in Gissel is subject to differing interpretations of whether the court intended
the accompanying circumstances to be taken into consideration in applying § 8(c). Thus, the
Ayres court's assertion that Lundy is controlling fails to reveal the court's rationale for finding
the speech protected.
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ion does not adopt the literal interpretation of section 8(c), then the
opinion is inconsistent with most Fourth Circuit precedent because in
cases prior to Ayres where the court applied the circumstances test, the
court noted the effect of the circumstances accompanying the speech." In
Ayres, however, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Board's determination that
other unfair labor practices occurred in conjunction with the superintendent's speech, but the court did not indicate whether these other violations
had any effect on the character of the speech. Thus, although the superintendent's prepared speech was informative in nature and would have been
protected whether the literal interpretation of section 8(c) or the circumstances test was applied, 0 the court did not indicate clearly whether the
accompanying circumstances were considered in evaluating the superintendent's speech.
B.

Discharge of Employees

The rights of employees under the NLRA also can conflict with employer rights not provided in the NLRA. Although an employer has a right
to hire and fire employees at his own discretion,' he cannot exercise that
right in a discriminatory manner. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA protects
employees from discriminatory hiring, firing, or treatment by an employer
when the employer's actions are for the purpose of encouraging or discour3 There is some argument that the Fourth Circuit continues to adhere to a circumstances
test. Judge Winter, who wrote Ayres and participated in Lundy, also wrote opinions advocating the use of the circumstances test. See NLRB v. Nu-Southern Dyeing & Finishing, Inc.,
444 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Greensboro Hosiery Mills, 398 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1970).
In addition, the late Judge Craven, who participated in Ayres, and Judge Field, who participated in Lundy, both participated in opinions recommending the circumstances test. See
NLRB v. Tamper, Inc., 522 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1975) (Field); NLRB v. Holly Farms Poultry
Indus., Inc., 470 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1972) (Field); NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 435 F.2d 1208 (4th
Cir. 1970) (Craven). Thus, it is doubtful that the Fourth Circuit has abandoned the circumstances test.
31 See note 31 supra.
41Arguably, the employer's speech was not objectionable and the accompanying circumstances could not taint the character of the speech. In its examination of the employer's
speech in Ayres, the court stated that "such a speech is protected by § 8(c) and may not be
found to be a violation of the Act." 551 F.2d at 588 (emphasis added). But see Lundy Packing
Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 139, 145, 91 L.R.R.M. 1586, 1587 (1976), rev'd in part, Lundy Packing Co.
v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1977) (the employer's warning that employees might have
to testify about the signing of authorization cards was the employer's method of informing
the employees that reprisals would result if employees signed the cards). In addition, coincidence of the employer's speech and the occurrence of other unfair labor practice is not
sufficient grounds for holding the speech unprotected. See NLRB v. Holly Farms Poultry
Indus., Inc., 470 F.2d 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1972). There must be evidence presented which links
the employer's speech with the accompanying unfair labor practices. Id. at 985.
1 The employer has an inherent right to create the employment relationship by hiring
an individual and to terminate that relationship by firing the individual. See Lozano Enterprises v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1966).
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aging the union membership of the employee. 2 Employees discharged for
a reason other than their union membership may be protected by section
7 of the NLRA.3 Under section 7, employees, whether members of a union
or not,4 have a protected right to organize, unionize, bargain collectively,
and engage in concerted activities' "for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or a complaint."6 The Fourth
Circuit considered the conflict between employer and employee rights in
Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 7 involving the discharge of union
members, and in United Merchants and Manufacturers, Inc. v. NLRB,8
involving nonunion employees who were discharged for engaging in con,
certed activities.
In United Merchants, two employees were discharged for signing other
employees' time cards when their work shift ended although the employer
usually overlooked such conduct.' To protest these discharges, co-workers
of the discharged employees stopped work, requested the employer to reverse the discharges, and refused to return to work when instructed to do
so by a supervisor."0 The protestors resorted to a work stoppage because
they lacked an established grievance procedure." When the protestors
threatened to walk out, the employer instructed his supervisor to
"terminate" any employees who left.12 After being informed of these instructions, the employees requested and received time to discuss the original dismissals. 3 Although the employer made no effort to discharge the
protesting employees because of the work stoppage, 4 several employees left
2 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) provides that "it shall be unfair labor
practice for an employer. . by discrimination in regard to hire to tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization."
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970); see Labor, Section A, note 5 supra.
See NLRB v. City Yellow Cab. Co., 344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965); Salt River Valley
Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953). If the use of economic pressure by
unorganized employees is not protected, the rights of employees under § 7 will be inhibited.
The employees are likely to fear that any activity or attempt to organize will result in
employer retaliation. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure By Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1218 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Protected of Economic Pressure].
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967). See generally Cox,
The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951); Koretz & Rabin, The
Development and History of Protected ConcertedActivity, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715 (1973).
7 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1977).
554 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1277.
Id. Although the majority opinion implies that the work stoppage was conducted in
an orderly fashion, id. at 1277-78, the dissent notes that employees milled about, stood on
their desks, and many of the employees who were Filipinos persisted in speaking in their
native tongue. Id. at 1280-81.
1 Id.

12Id. at 1278.
13 Id.
11Id.

at 1279.
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work in support of the originally discharged employees and subsequently
were terminated." The employees who were charged for protesting filed a
complaint with the Board.
The Board found that the work stoppage and walkout were concerted
activities entitled to protection by section 7 of the NLRA and that the
employer's discharge of employees engaged in protected activity was an
unfair labor practice.' 6 The Fourth Circuit affirmed these findings and
noted that the work stoppage and walkout were undertaken for the
"mutual aid or protection' 7 of all the employees." Furthermore, the
United Merchants court asserted that regardless of the employer's right to
discharge employees for time card infractions, fellow employees have a
protected right under the'NLRA to protest the discharges. 9 The court
noted, however, that under the Fourth Circuit's holding in Cone Mills
Corp. v. NLRB,2 0 the work stoppage would lose its protected status if the
stoppage was particularly flagrant. 2' In Cone Mills, the Fourth Circuit held
that a defiant attitude on the part of the employees22 and failure to use an
1
Id. at 1278.
Id. The employer violated § 8(a)(1) because he interfered with the employees' § 7
rights. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970); see Labor, Section A, note 6 supra.
17NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970); see Labor, Section A, note 5 supra.
"s 554 F.2d at 1278; see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (nonunion employees, lacking a grievance procedure, engaged in protected walkout to protest
working conditions); NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., Hanes Corp., 413 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1969)
(nonunion employees participating in work stoppage to petition for higher pay were engaged
in protected activity); NLRB v. Serv-Air, Inc., 401 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1968) (in the
absence of an established grievance procedure a spontaneous work stoppage to present a
grievance was a protected activity); Elam v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (nonunion
employees who engage in work stoppage to present grievances about working conditions are
engaged in concerted conduct for "mutual aid and protection"); NLRB v. Greensboro Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 180 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1950) (one employee was discharged for attempting
to organize a union and numerous other employees were discharged when they protested the
initial discharge; the court held the conduct of all employees protected by § 7).
1"554 F.2d at 1278; see NLRB v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 449 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972); B. & P. Motor Express Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 1021 (7th
Cir. 1969); LTV Electrosystems, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 1122 (4th Cir. 1969).
- 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969). In Cone Mills, unionized employees engaged in a work
stoppage to protest the discharge of fellow employees.
21 Id. at 454. A walkout can be flagrant also and lose its protection. See NLRB v. Blades
Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965) (walkout unprotected where employees constantly
walked out for the remainder of the work day every time the employer refused to settle a
grievance); Cloke, Concerted Activity and the National Labor Policy, 5 U. SAN FERNANDO
VALLEY L. REV. 289, 292 (1976). The Cone Mills flagrancy test, however, applies to work
stoppages only and the opinion does not indicate whether Cone Mills could be applied to
remove a walkout from protection.
1 413 F.2d at 454. In Cone Mills, the employees refused to return to work after repeatedly
being told to either leave the plant or go back to work. The court found that the employees'
action of remaining in the plant while refusing to work was defiant. Id.; see NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (employee conduct not protected where employees
took over buildings, engaged in sit-down strike, and violated employer's right to possession
of property); Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977) (employee
sabotage of employer's machines held defiant conduct).
's
"
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existing grievance procedure3 were evidence of a flagrant work stoppage.
Since none of these factors were present in United Merchants, 2 the court
held the Cone Mills exception inapplicable.? Consequently, the work stoppage was protected by section 7 of the NLRA. In addition, the court held
that even if the work stoppage in United Merchantshad not been protected
due to the flagrant nature of employee conduct, the employer had condoned the work stoppage by his actions.2 1 By allowing the employees time
to discuss their grievances and by failing to discharge employees who returned to work after the stoppage ended, the court asserted that the employer indicated his intention to overlook any misconduct which would
render the stoppage flagrant.?
The United Merchants court properly determined that the work stoppage and walkout were protected activities. Employees have a right to
engage in concerted activities to protest the discharge of fellow employees
and their conduct will be protected so long as it is not flagrant. Since
flagrant employee conduct was lacking in United Merchants, the court
held the employees' activities to be protected.? Thus, the employer's discharge of employees who walked out constituted an unfair labor practice
2
and the employees were entitled to reinstatement. 1
2 413 F.2d at 454. A grievance procedure, if available, should be used instead of concerted activity. Failure to use such a procedure constitutes flagrant employee action. Id.
Contra, Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1971) (employees engaged
in protected activity even where they failed to use an existing grievance procedure).
1 In United Merchants, the employees lacked a grievance procedure and the conduct of
the employees during the work stoppage was not defiant. 554 F.2d at 1277-79; see note 10
supra.
1 554 F.2d at 1279.
26 Id. The employer's decision to tolerate flagrant employee conduct probably would be
based on business judgment. Although the employer could discharge employees for flagrant
conduct, the employer could not continue production until replacements were found if a
substantial number of employees or key employees were discharged. Id. at 1281 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the employer could ignore flagrant employee conduct in order to maintain
production.
z Id. at 1279; see Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97, 103 (7th Cir. 1971)
(employer's intention to condone employees' actions must be clearly apparent); Confectionary & Tobacco Drivers & Warehousemen's Union, Local 805 v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1963).
554 F.2d at 1278. The employees had a right to protest the initial discharges by using
a work stoppage or a walkout. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. Since protected
activity does not have to occur immediately after a grievance arises, NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962), the walkout was not too far removed from the initial
discharges and was protected by § 7 of the NLRA.
" 554 F.2d at 1278. If the work stoppage had been flagrant, however, the employer could
have discharged the employees. Id. at 1279; see Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d at 454.
In such a case, the employer would not have had to discharge all of the employees who had
engaged in the flagrant work stoppage and he could have used his discretion in determining
which of the employees were to be discharged. See 554 F.2d at 1281 (Bryan, J., dissenting);
Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d at 454; NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70 (3d
Cir. 1954). Consequently, even though the employees who walked out were the only ones
discharged, the employer could have discharged the same employees on the basis of a flagrant
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While the NLRA grants both union and nonunion employees the right
to engage in concerted activities free from employer interference, the
NLRA also protects employees from discriminatory action by the employer
when the employer acts in response to the employee's union membership.3
The Fourth Circuit faced the conflict between the employer's right to
discharge employees for just cause 3' and the right of the employee to protection from discharge based on union activity" in Neptune Water Meter
Co. v. NLRB. 3 3 In Neptune, two employees whose records disclosed tardiness and "unexcused absences attributable to drunkeness ' 34 were discharged purportedly for these failings.3 5 The discharges occurred, however,
only after the employees signed union authorization cards and participated
in union activities, although they had been warned by the employer not
to get involved with the union." Subsequent to the discharges, a supervisor
made a statement to one of the discharged employees that the employee
had been warned "about messing with the union. ' 3 The Fourth Circuit
found that substantial evidence 31 supported the Board's finding that the
discharges were unfair labor practices39 and held that an employer has
engaged in an unfair labor practice if the discharged employee would not
have been discharged "except for the fact of his union activity." 4
The Fourth Circuit, recognizing that a discriminatory motive on the
work stoppage. Although such a holding would be discriminatory, it does recognize that
employees have an obligation, accompanying their § 7 rights, to refrain from flagrant activity.
See 554 F.2d at 1281 (Bryan, J., dissenting); Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d at 454.
1 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); see text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
1 "Management can discharge for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all" so long
as a motive prohibited by § 8(a)(3) of-the NLRA is not the reason for the discharge. Lozano
Enterprises v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1966), quoting, NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d
406, 412 (5th Cir. 1956); see Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir.
1977) (businessmen do not "hire and fire without any reason at all"). Furthermore, if the
dismissal was for just cause, the Board is empowered to refuse reinstatement of the discharged
employee. NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
3 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Insofar as an employee's right to belong
to a union is protected under § 7 of the NLRA, any action taken by an employer in contravention of the employee's right to belong to a union is a violation of § 8(a)(1). NLRB v. Burnup
& Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964); see Labor, Section A, note 6, supra. Therefore, where
an employee's union membership is a factor in the employee's discharge, both § 8(a)(3) and
§ 8(a)(1) could provide protection from discriminatory action by the employer. Nevertheless,
courts do recognize a distinction between the two sections and hold that cases involving
discrimination due to union activity must be examined under § 8(a)(3) standards. See NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); Protection of Economic Pressure, supra note 4, at 1198.
- 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1977).
3,

Id. at 569.
Id.

e

Id. at 570.
Id. The court characterized this statement as the "gloating refrain" of "I told you so."

31

Id.

* See Labor, Section A, note 28 supra.
551 F.2d at 570.
4o Id.; accord, NLRB v. Klaue, 523 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1975).
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part of the employer is an essential element in the proof of a violation of
section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA, 41 stated that the presence of a discriminatory
motive would justify a finding that an unfair labor practice was committed
even where proper grounds for the employees' dismissals also were present.412 Since the employer presented evidence that the discharges were
caused by the poor work records of the employees,43 the Board was faced
with the burden of proving that the discharges were improperly motivated.44 Furthermore, the court noted that the Board's proof of improper
intent on the part of the employer must be based on evidence and not on
11Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA states that the discharge of an employee is discriminatory
if the employee's union membership or union activity was a factor in the employer's decision
to discharge. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); see note 2 supra. The standard
used to examine § 8(a)(3) violations has undergone judicial modification. Initially the standard for determining whether § 8(a)(3) had been violated was a balancing of the employee's
right to protection from discriminatory employer conduct based on the employee's union
activity and the employer's right to run his business as he chooses. See Getman, Section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. REv.
735, 743 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Free Employee Choice]. This test required the trier of
fact to balance "in light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee
rights" against the employer's business reasons for discharging the employee. NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963). Employer motive became a more important factor
after American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). In American Ship, the Supreme
Court indicated that a § 8(a)(3) violation occurred only where the employer's intent to
discourage union membership was proved. Id. at 313; see Free Employee Choice, supra at
747; Note, Proving an 8(a)(3) Violation: The Changing Standard, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 866
(1966). Justice White, in a special concurrence, criticized the Court's "myopic focus" in
American Ship and noted that "the balance and accommodation of 'conflicting legitimate
interests' in labor relations does not admit of [the] simple solution" of relying only on intent.
380 U.S. at 325. Indeed, the effect of American Ship was lessened by NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
Under Great Dane, the effect of the employer's conduct on employee rights must be
ascertained to determine whether motive is a necessary finding. Where an employer's conduct
is "inherently destructive of important employee rights, no proof of anti-union motivation is
needed" and the Board can find that the employer has committed an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 34. Where the effect is comparatively slight, the employer must demonstrate a business
justification for his conduct. Id. Once the employer has presented evidence of a justification,
the burden is on the Board's general counsel to prove an anti-union motivation. Id. Great
Dane currently represents the rule governing the proof of § 8(a)(3) violations. See Protection
of Economic Pressure,supra note 4, at 1201. Nevertheless, one author has suggested going
beyond Great Dane by holding certain conduct a per se violation of § 8(a)(3), thus alleviating
the necessity of examining effect or motive in certain cases. Note, NLRA § 8(a)(3): A Per Se
Approach, 40 U. CiN. L. REv. 263 (1971).
11551 F.2d at 569. The court's finding that a discriminatory motive would justify a
finding of an unfair labor practice even where proper grounds for dismissal were present is
consistent with prior holdings of the Fourth Circuit and other circuits. See NLRB v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 423 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., Hanes Corp.,
413 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1969); Filler Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co.,
328 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352
(2d Cir. 1962).
551 F.2d at 569.
'

Id.; see note 41 supra.
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the assumption that because the employee was a union member his discharge was wrongfully motivated. 5 The Fourth Circuit stated that to find
improper motive, there must be "a basis in the record for a finding that
the employee would not have been discharged ... except for the fact of
his union activity."4 This test requires a determination whether the employee's conduct warranted a discharge or whether his conduct only warranted a lesser punishment. 4 Applying this test, the Fourth Circuit sustained the Board's finding that the dismissals were not for just cause
because the employees would not have been discharged except for their
union activity." The court's decision in Neptune, therefore, was based on
the court's view that sufficient facts were present to show an improper
motive.
In contrast, the dissent maintained that the Board had failed to prove
improper motive." The dissent noted that one employee had been warned
twice about his tardiness,"0 but the employee persisted in arriving late.
Thus, the dissent claimed that the employee's flagrant disregard of the
warnings justified his dissmissal.5 ' Furthermore, the dissent objected to the
Board's attempt to determine whether the employees' infractions were of
such a significance to warrant discharge and contended that an employer
has the right to determine the measure of discipline for employee infractions.",' In addition, the dissent felt that the anti-union statement by a
11551 F.2d at 569. The court noted that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1976), allowed a finding of improper motive
only where the Board had shown an "affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer
rejected the good cause [for the discharge] and chose a bad one." Id. at 1337; quoting NLRB
v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1961).
11551 F.2d at 570.
47 Id.

11Id. In its examination of the facts, the Board determined that the two employees, who
were both union members and had been warned about joining the union when they were
hired, id., were discharged by the employer because of their work records. Id. at 569. The
Board further found that despite occasional infractions, work performaces of the employees
were satisfactory. Id. at 569-70. The Board concluded that the employees' work records did
not justify their dismissals. Id. at 570. But see Id. at 573 (Russell, J., dissenting); note 52
infra. In addition, the Board found that the supervisor's statement to the employee that he
had been warned "about messing with the union," 551 F.2d at 570, indicated that the employer's decision to discharge the employee was motivated by the employee's union membership. Id.
' Id. at 574 (Russell, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 573.
51 Id.
2 See note 31 supra. The court's holding in Neptune, see text accompanying notes 4647 supra, requires the Board to determine whether the employee's violations constituted a
reasonable grounds for discharge. If the Board determines that the grounds for discharge
would justify only a milder form of punishment, then the Board will infer an improper motive
for the discharge. The dissent, however, criticized the holding and contended that the Board
has no right to invade the province of management in determining disciplinary measures. 551
F.2d at 573 (Russell, J., dissenting); accord, NLRB v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Co., Div. of
Condec Corp., 469 F.2d 1016, 1024-25 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ogle Protection Serv., Inc.,
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supervisor 3 did not indicate that the discharges were motivated by the
employees' union membership." Thus, the dissent concluded that the
Board had proved little more than the employees' union membership and
contended that union membership alone does not justify a finding that the
reasons for the discharges were improper.5 Despite these contentions, the
Fourth Circuit properly held the discharges to be an unfair labor practice
in violation of section 8(a) (3). The insignificant nature of employee infractions, 6 the employer's failure to discharge the employees until after he had
learned of their union activity,7 and the blatancy of the supervisor's speech
following the discharges" allow the inference of an improper motive for the
discharges.
C.

The Duty to Bargain: Mandatory v. Non-mandatory Subjects of
Bargaining

Two recent Fourth Circuit cases concern the duty of the union and
employer to bargain collectively. Sections 8(a)(5)1 and 8(b)(3) 2 of the

NLRA impose a duty on the employer and the union to bargain in good
faith with each other. The parties are required by NLRA section 8(d) to
bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Any subject of bargaining included in the scope of section 8(d) is

deemed to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and is subject to the good
375 F.2d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 1967); Lozano Enterprises v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir.
1966); NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1956).
See text accompanying note 37 supra.
The dissent argues that the supervisor who made the insolent statement to the discharged employee did not take part in the decision to discharge. 551 F.2d at 574 (Russell, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, there was no indication that the supervisor knew of the employer's
reason for discharging the employee. Id. Thus, the dissent argued that the supervisor's statement did not indicate an improper motive on the part of the employer. Id. Nevertheless, the
supervisor was the person who initiated the discharge by informing his superiors that the
employee should be discharged, Brief for Neptune at 7, and the court may have inferred that
the supervisor's initial request to discharge the employee was based on the employee's union
activities. Thus, the court may be imputing the supervisor's improper motive to the employer's actual decision to discharge. 551 F.2d at 570.
m Id. at 574.
51The employee was late eight of the 17 days he worked. On four of the days he was late
by only one to ten minutes. On seven out of the 17 days, the employee was between one hour
and two hours and fifteen minutes early. Furthermore, on ten of 17 days the employee worked
ten hours or longer. Id. at 570.
Id. at 569.
See notes 37 & 54 supra.
NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees."
2 NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer."
3 NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). Section 8(d) requires that the parties must
bargain in good faith those subjects within the scope of § 8(d).
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faith requirement of section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).1 The Board determines
which subjects are mandatory.' To be mandatory, a subject must
"encompass some aspect of the employer-employee relationship" ' and also
must affect the conditions of employment materially or significantly.'
Those subjects of bargaining not within the scope of section 8(d) are nonmandatory and the parties can choose whether or not to bargain on those
subjects.8 On the other hand, failure to bargain in good faith concerning
mandatory items violates section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) and the employer or
union commits an unfair labor practice.' Furthermore, insistence on the
inclusion of a non-mandatory subject in the bargaining agreement also
violates section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3).11 In Movers & Warehousemen'sAssociation of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. v. NLRB, " the Fourth Circuit
faced the issue of whether a lockout 2 could be used to bring pressure upon
the union for inclusion of a non-mandatory subject of bargaining in the
contract which the parties were negotiating.
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1957).
The Board is a body with the special expertise necessary to define the "terms and
conditions of employment" which are mandatory under § 8(d). See, e.g., NLRB v. Columbus
Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1976); NLRB
v. Local 264, Laborer's Int'l Union, 529 F.2d 778, 787 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. Local Union No.
189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1965) (although Board has special
expertise, courts also have ability to classify bargaining subjects).
6 NLRB v. Local 264, Laborer's Int'l Union, 529 F.2d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1976). In Local
264, the Board found that the union had violated § 8(b)(3) by insisting the impasse that the
employer contribute to a fund to defray the expenses of administering union monies. The
court found that although pension or fringe benefit funds are mandatory subjects of bargaining because they affect the employer-employee relationship, the fund proposed by the union
was a non-mandatory subject of bargaining because the employees were affected only indirectly by the fund. Insistence during bargaining upon the non-mandatory subject was an
unfair labor practice. Id. at 786-87.
7 NLRB v. Ladish Co., 538 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1976) quoting Seattle First Nat'l
Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1971); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387
F.2d 542, 548 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821, 823 (4th
Cir. 1953). For examples of non-mandatory subjects of bargaining see NLRB v. Pecheur
Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953) (employer insisting that strike be terminated);
NLRB v. Dalton Tel. Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951) (requiring union to register with the
state for lawsuit purposes); NLRB v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949)
(allowing nonunion employees to vote on union decisions); NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son
Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941) (requiring union to organize employer's competitors); Hartsell
Mills Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1940) (insisting on the dropping of unfair labor
charges).
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1957).
See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra; NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1957).
" See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1957); Movers &
Warehousemen's Ass'n of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 962 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 75 (1977).
550 F.2d 962 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 75 (1977).
12 In a lockout, the employer temporarily ceases operation and refuses to allow the employees to work. Lockouts are normally used to enhance the employer's bargaining position.
See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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In Movers & Warehousemen's Association, the employer 3 and the
union had enjoyed a stable bargaining relationship for twenty years.' 4 During contract negotiations, the employer proposed a new procedure for ratification of collective bargaining agreements providing for employee ratification by mail.' 5 Union negotiators objected strenuously to the clause, but
the employer threatened to lock out the employees unless the contract,
including the ratification clause, was accepted by the union.' The union
refused to accept the contract and the lockout followed. Upon the filing of
unfair labor charges by the union, the employer withdrew its demand for
the inclusion of the ratification clause and stated that the lack of a contrac7
tual agreement was the only reason for the continuance of the lockout.
The lockout continued for about a month until the union and the employer
reached agreement on a contract.' 8
The Fourth Circuit affirmed 'the Board's finding that the proposed
ratification by mail clause was a non-mandatory subject of bargaining."
The court applied the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp. 0 Borg-Warnerheld that the good faith requirement of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) applies only to mandatory subject of
bargaining.2 ' Although either party may introduce any non-mandatory
subject during negotiations, the opposing party is under no obligation to
bargain in good faith about the non-mandatory subject." Furthermore, the
fact that a party has negotiated in good faith with respect to mandatory
subjects of bargaining will not allow that party to make a non-mandatory
issue a condition precedent to the acceptance of a contract.2 By limiting
the good faith requirement to mandatory subjects, the Borg-Warner Court
hoped to enhance the duty to bargain over mandatory subjects.24 Because
there are fewer subjects about which the parties are obligated to bargain
there is a greater opportunity for settlement.2 The limitation also protects
'1

The employer is actually a group of employers united for bargaining purposes. 550 F.2d

at 964.
" Id.
"1 Id. The union consistently maintained that voting should take place at the union hall,
id., and the employer eventually conceded that ratification was a matter solely within the
union's internal affairs. Id. at 966.

11Id. at 964.
'7 Id.
" Id. at 964.
" Id. at 965.

356 U.S. 342 (1957). In Borg-Warner, the employer insisted to the point of impasse on
the inclusion of a ballot clause and a recognition clause. The ballot clause called "for a prestrike secret vote of those employees (union and nonunion) as to the employer's last offer.".
Id. at 343. The recognition clause sought to exclude the national union as the bargaining unit
and recognize the local affiliate instead. Id. at 343-44. The Court held both of these subjects
to be non-mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at 349.
21

Id.

Id.
Id.
11See Protection of Economic Pressure,Labor, Section B, supra note 4, at 1216.
2 See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term 1957, 44
2

VA.
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weaker unions by preventing management from insisting upon a wide variety of contract clauses.2" Relying on the Borg-WarnerCourt's limitation of
the good faith requirement, the Fourth Circuit in Movers & Warehousemen's Association reasoned that the proposed ratification procedure was
not a "term or condition of employment" and that ratification was a matter solely of union concern. 27 Therefore, the ratification procedure was not
a mandatory subject of bargaining? and the employer could not lawfully
insist on the inclusion of the clause in the bargaining agreement.29
Since the employer expressed his insistence by physically locking out
his employees, the lockout constituted an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) .3 Lockouts are not per se illegal, but a
lockout must be used only in support of a legitimate bargaining position. 3'
The Fourth Circuit found that the lockout in Movers & Warehousemen's
32
Association was for the purpose of compelling acceptance of the contract.
Since the proposed contract contained mandatory clauses bargained in
accordance with the good faith requirement of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA
as well as the non-mandatory ratification clause, the court had to determine whether a lockout in support of both proper and improper clauses
REv. 1057, 1082 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
2' Id. at 1082.
550 F.2d at 965-66; see Houchens Mkt. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208,
212 (6th Cir. 1967). There is a distinct difference between the "ballot" clause of Borg-Warner,
see note 20 supra, and the ratification clause of Movers & Warehousemen's Ass'n. The ballot
clause "affects the employer-employee relationship in much the same way as a no strike
clause, in that it may determine the timing of strikes or even whether a strike will occur by
requiring a vote to ascertain the employees' sentiment prior to the union's decision." NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 353. The ratification clause simply deals
with how the vote will be taken. 550 F.2d at 965.
550 F.2d at 965.
Id. at 966; see Houchens Mkt. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208 (6th Cir.
1967) (insistence on employee ratification clause is unjustified); NLRB v. Darlington Veneer
Co., 236 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1956) (insistence "furnishes of itself" a sufficient bases for
violation); text accompanying note 10 supra.
550 F.2d at 966. The employer, by trying to limit the authority of his employee's
bargaining representative violated § 8(a)(1) because employees have a protected right to
engage in collective bargaining through their representative without interference from the
employer. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970); see NLRB v. Darlington Vener Veneer Co., 236
F.2d 85, 89 (4th Cir. 1956). In addition, since the employer sought to weaken the employees'
ratification power, see text accompanying note 34 infra, the employer's conduct in locking
out the employees was based on an improper motive and violated § 8(a)(3). 550 F.2d at 966;
see Labor, Section B, note 2 supra. Finally, conditioning acceptance of the entire contract
on the inclusion of the non-mandatory clause violated the good faith requirement of § 8(a)(5).
550 F.2d at 966.
1' See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965) (no unfair labor
practice resulted from a lockout which occurred after negotiations had broken down where
the sole purpose for the lockout was to apply economic pressure in support of a legitimate
bargaining position); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council, 434 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1970);
Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. CHi. L. REv.
614 (1961); Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown
Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193 (1965).
1 550 F.2d at 966.
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would be protected.3 3The court found that the employer, by his insistence
on the ratification clause, intended "to injure the Union by weakening the
ratification power of its members" 3 and that this improper intent removed
the entire lockout from the protection of the NLRA. 35 In addition, the
lockout did not regain its legitimacy when the employer rescinded his
insistence on the ratification clause.36 The court found the employer's failure to offer reinstatement and backpay for the work time lost during the
unlawful lockout sufficient justification to deny renewed legitimacy to the
lockout. Thus, the lockout violated sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5)
and the employees were entitled to receive backpay for the period during
which they were locked out.38
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Movers & Warehousemen's
Association represents a standard application of the Supreme Court's
Borg-Warner rule. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Borg-Warner, criticized
the limitation of the good faith requirement of bargaining to mandatory
subjects and stated that he could not understand "a concept of
'bargaining' which enables one to 'propose' a particular point, but not to
'insist' on it as a condition to agreement."39 He interpreted section 8(d) as
establishing the mandatory requirements of bargaining, but felt that parties should be able to engage in good faith bargaining as to matters not
within the mandatory scope of section 8(d).1° Thus, Harlan would limit all
subjects of bargaining by a requirement of good faith-good faith in presenting the subject and good faith in bargaining over it. 4 The commenta3

id.

31Id. But see Free Employee Choice, Labor, Section B, supra note 41, at 751 (the
amount of injury to the union may be small where the employer and the union have had a
stable bargaining relationship over a number of years; "in such cases it is generally understood that the employer accepts the union and is willing to work with it").
11550 F.2d at 966. The court stated that its holding is in accordance with the established
rule in other areas of labor law that the presence of an improper motive is sufficient to remove
the employer's conduct from the protection of the NLRA. Id.; see, e.g., Neptune Water Meter
Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1977).
-' 550 F.2d at 966.

3 Id. Indeed, "the employers never acknowledged their wrongdoing with regard to the
lockout." Id.
Id. at 967.
n 356 U.S. at 352 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan found support for his interpretation
in the legislative history of § 8(d). Prior to the 1947 amendments of the NLRA, bargaining
was only governed by a good faith standard which had been judicially created. Id. at 354.
The Board had the duty to ascertain whether the good faith requirement had been met, but
occasionally used this power to regulate which subjects could be bargained. Id. When § 8(d)
was written into the NLRA in 1947, Congress included wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment as required subjects of bargaining. Id. at 355. Congress' action was
taken in response to the Board's attempt to regulate the bargaining process. Id. at 355-56.
Harlan felt that the legislative history of § 8(d) "evinces a clear congressional purpose to
assure the parties to a proposed collective bargaining agreement the greatest degree of freedom in their negotiations, and to require the Board to remain as aloof as possible from
regulation of the bargaining process in its substantive aspects." Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 359; see Cox, supra note 25, at 1086 (it is better to bargain an issue than "to
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tors, also, criticized Borg- Warner and supported Justice Harlan's dissent.2
Nevertheless, Borg-Warner continues to be applied in evaluating the
collective bargaining process. 3 Finally, even if the standard promulgated
by Justice Harlan in his dissent was the governing law, the Fourth Circuit
probably would have reached the same result in Movers & Warehousemen's Association. The proposed ratification procedure was clearly beyond
the bounds of the employer-employee relationship and the employer was
trying to interfere with the union's internal affairs.
The distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory subjects also
arose in a Fourth Circuit case concerning the inclusion of an interest arbitration clause44 in a contract. In NLRB v. Greensboro Printing Pressmen
& Assistants' Union No. 319,15 the employer and the union had maintained
a stable bargaining relationship and all of their previous contracts had
included an interest arbitration clause.46 At the expiration of their existing
contract, the employer opposed inclusion of the arbitration clause in the
new contract.47 The parties negotiated to the point of impasse concerning
inclusion of the clause. 8 In accordance with the existing contract, the
inclusion issue was submitted to arbitration after the parties reached impasse. 9 When arbitration failed, the company filed an unfair labor charge
conceal the issue by legal repression").
12 Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 272
(1964) (advocating the overruling of Borg-Warner); see Feinsinger, The NationalLabor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MICH. L. REV. 807 (1959); Fleming, The Obligation
to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961). Professor Cox stated that "[c]ollective
bargaining is too dynamic for [the Board] to decide today what should be required or
permissible subjects of collective bargaining tomorrow." Cox, supra note 25, at 1084. Professor
Cox also noted that the Board is ill-suited to determine the proper subjects for bargaining.
Id. at 1083. He also contended that although Borg-Warner should be overruled,
[lt is too late now to reverse the whole sequence of decisions which the Court has
permitted without really facing the issues. Perhaps the best course to follow in the
future would be to reject all new attempts to limit the phrase "terms or conditions
of employment," thus reading it to embrace every stipulation which management
or labor might advance not inconsistent with a federal statute or declared public
policy. This would seem to be in keeping with the basic philosophy or collective
bargaining ...
Id. at 1086.
1 The Ninth Circuit recently held that ratification clauses are non-mandatory subjects
of bargaining and, therefore, cannot be insisted upon to the point of impasse. NLRB v. Cheese
Barn, Inc., 558 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1977); accord, NLRB v. C & W Lektra Bat Co., 513 F.2d
200 (6th Cir. 1975); American Seating Co. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1970); Houchens
Mkt. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208 (6th Cir 1967); NLRB v. Darlington
Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956).
" An interest arbitration clause is a clause in which the parties agree to submit to
arbitration any terms of a new contract which cannot be settled by negotiations. Fleming,
Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitrations, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (1963).
549 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
" Id. at 308.
17 Id.
,xId.
It Id.
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against the union alleging that insistence to the point of impasse on the
.inclusion of the arbitration clause constituted a failure to bargain in good
faith.2 The Fourth Circuit held that an interest arbitration clause was a
non-mandatory subject of bargaining because the clause did not affect the
conditions of employment during the term of the contract and, therefore,
insistence to the point of impasse on the inclusion of that clause violated
the section 8(b)(3) duty to bargain in good faith.'
The denial of mandatory status to an interest arbitration clause in
Greensboro Printing is unwise. The interest arbitration clause does have
an effect on the conditions of employment, 2 although the effect is delayed
for one bargaining session,53 and should come within the scope of section
8(d)." Indeed, pensions and retirement plans extend beyond the contract
period, yet they are mandatory subjects of bargaining." Furthermore, arbitration provides for a "peaceful solution of all disputes"56 rather than a test
of strength between contending forces.-7 Critics of interest arbitration contend, however, that the use of economic weapons in collective bargaining
is an important part of the national labor policy and that the threat of a
strike or lockout, "rather than the reasoned arguments of the negotiators,"
" Id. The company alleged that the union had violated § 8(b)(3). See note 2 supra.
' 549 F.2d at 309. The same holding was reached by the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v.
Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976). In
that case, the Board argued that an interest arbitration clause did not affect the'conditions
of employment during the term of the contract. Id. at 1165. Therefore, the Board asserted
that the clause was not a mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of § 8(d). Id.
The union argued that an interest arbitration clause was intertwined with the terms and
conditions of employment. Id. Therefore, the union asserted that the clause should be viewed
as a mandatory subject within § 8(d). The union also argued that employees would gain peace
of mind by inclusion of an interest arbitration clause. Since conflicts would be submitted to
arbitration, the employees would not have to fear a bargaining lockout by the employer.
Arbitration would resolve the conflict without either side having to resort to the use of
economic pressure. Id.
51Although an interest arbitration clause is procedural, inclusion of such a clause in a
contract will have a substantive effect insofar as the contract terms established by an arbitrator might vary from those negotiated between the parties. Note, Interest Arbitrationand the
NLRB: A Case for the Self-Terminating Interest Arbitration Clause, 86 YALE L.J. 715, 718
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Self-Terminating Interest Arbitration Clause].
0 The inclusion of an interest arbitration clause in a contract only has an effect when
the existing contract is due to expire. Any terms determined under the existing interest
arbitration agreement affect the contract being negotiated and not the contract in which the
clause was included originally. Id. at 722.
5'See text accompanying note 3 supra.
"' Self-Terminating Interest ArbitrationClause, supra note 52, at 722; see Retail Clerks
Union No. 1550 v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828 (1964) (pensions
held mandatory); NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954) (retirement plan
held mandatory).
I National labor policy benefits by the presence of mature contracts which provide an
internal mechanism for the peaceful solution of all disputes. Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393 F.2d 221, 226 (4th Cir. 1968).
31 In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964), the Supreme Court
noted that arbitration is a useful substitute for strikes. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
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often results in a "settlement at the eleventh hour of negotiations."5 8
If interest arbitration is granted mandatory status, the courts should
prohibit use of the clause to obtain inclusion of interest arbitration clauses
in subsequent contracts. 59 Unless such a limitation is created, a party could
require arbitration of the issue of whether an interest arbitration clause
should be included in a new contract. Resubmission of the issue to an
arbitrator each time the existing contract expired conceivably could bind
an unwilling party to perpetual inclusion of an interest arbitration clause."0
Despite the benefits to be gained by using interest arbitration, however,
the circuits continue to hold that interest arbitration is a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining and that insistence upon the inclusion of an interest
arbitration clause is an unfair labor practice.'
A.

C.

PETER GREGORY

Work Preservation Contract Clauses

In Humphrey v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association,I the Fourth
Circuit attempted to delineate the scope of sections 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 2 and
8(e) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibit "hot
11Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective
Bargaining-An Examination of Compulsory InterestArbitration in New York, 51 ST.JOHNS
L. REv. 453, 454 (1977). The authors contend that although interest arbitration is useful in
the public sector, private industry should not resort to interest arbitration. Id.
"' The Fifth Circuit held that a party could not invoke the arbitration procedure to obtain
inclusion of an interest arbitration clause in a new contract in NLRB v. Columbus Printing
Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976).
See Self-Terminating Interest Arbitration Clause, supra note 52.
" The First Circuit recently held an interest arbitration clause to be a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining. NLRB v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 557 F.2d 894 (1st Cir. 1977). The court
found that interest arbitration settles nothing in the employer-employee relationship immediately, and bears only a "remote relationship" to wages, hours, and the terms and conditions
of employment. Id. at 898; accord, NLRB v. Greensboro Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Union No. 319, 549 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Columbus Printing Pressmen &
Assistants' Union No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976).
548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970). This section is specifically addressed to the problem of secondary boycotts and provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
threaten or coerce "any person" where "the object thereof" is to force any person to cease
handling the products of any other manufacturer or to cease doing business with any other
person.
Secondary boycotts most often involve union members refusing to handle products manufactured by other employers with whom the union has a dispute or demands by these
employees that their immediate employer cease doing business with another employer. See
generally, Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1962);
Note, Secondary Boycotts: The New Scope and Application of the "Cease Doing Business"
Requirement of Section 8(b)(4)(B), 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1077 (1971).
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). This section provides that it is an unfair labor practice for

1978]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

cargo agreements" 4 and "secondary boycotts."5 Since the Supreme Court's
decision in National Woodwork Manufacturer'sAssociationv. NLRB,I the
legality of primary work preservation agreements 7 has been clear. However, the characterization of bargaining agreements and union conduct as
either permissible work preservation or prohibited secondary activity has
proven to be a difficult task for the lower federal courts. This issue of
characterization was squarely before the Fourth Circuit in Humphrey.
The origins of the controversy in Humphrey lay in the serious reduction
in the amount of work available for longshoremen occasioned by the develany labor organization or any employer to enter into any agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer agrees to refrain from handling the products of any other employer
or to cease doing business with any person. Such agreements are unenforceable and void.
A "hot cargo agreement" has been defined as "one under which the employer relinquishes the freedom to handle or provide goods and services to employers whom the union
has designated." Comment, Work Recapture Agreements and Secondary Boycotts: ILA v.
NLRB (Consolidated Express, Inc.) 90 HAv. L. RaV. 815 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Work
Recapture].
Prior to the addition of § 8(e) to the NLRA, the Supreme Court had indicated that the
mere execution of an agreement between a union and an employer that the employer would
not handle the goods of another employer or the employer's voluntary observance of such an
agreement was not unlawful secondary activity. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 104-08 (1958). Thus, hot cargo agreements provided a means of circumventing the prohibitions against secondary boycotts. See Note, Hot Cargo Clauses as a Defense To Union-Induced Secondary Boycotts, 61 W. VA. L. RPv. 118 (1959). Section 8(e) was
designed to correct this gap in the legislation by making the hot cargo agreement itself
unlawful. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967).
Secondary boycotts are a category of prohibited secondary activity under section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA. However, there is no concise definition of secondary activity. See,
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386-87 (1969)
(the common law of labor relations has created no concept more elusive than that of secondary conduct).
In general, secondary activity is directed at involving "neutral" employers in a dispute
between a union and a third party. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341
.U.S. 675, 692 (1951). In this sense, the immediate employer of striking employees may be
"neutral" if the union's real objective is to pursue a dispute with another employer with whom
the immediate employer does business. See, e.g., George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d
323, (4th Cir. 1973). Secondary objectives are those which "extend beyond the immediate
employer and are aimed really at the union's difference with another employer." Local 636,
United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 858, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Lawful primary activities are those actions addressed to the labor relations between the
immediate employer and his employees. The test is whether the union activities are "germane
to the economic integrity of the. . . unit." Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v.
NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1964). However severe the incidental effects of lawful
primary activity on neutral employers, it is not thereby transformed into activity with a
secondary objective. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967);
American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 960 (1970).
6 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
7 In general, a work preservation clause is an agreement between an employer and his
employees that the employer will not engage in specified practices or require the employees
to handle certain products. The purpose of work preservation. agreements is to preserve and
protect the work traditionally performed by the employees. See National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640-42 (1967).
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opment of containerization. Containerization began to appear in the
Hampton Roads area in 1965, and became the subject of regulation in
successive collective bargaining agreements between the International
Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and the Hampton Roads Shipping Association (HRSA) beginning in 1968.1 The 1974 agreement contained rules
providing that if "full shipper's loads"'" were to be "stripped" or
"stuffed"" within a radius of fifty miles of the port center by workers other
than the employees of the consignee or the shipper, such work must be
performed by ILA labor." The contract also contained a provision for the
payment of liquidated damages by any offending carriers. 3 Earlier agreements between the ILA and the HRSA had not clearly asserted a claim to
this particular work as being within the exclusive province of ILA labor."
I Containerization refers to the shipping of cargo in large sealed boxes which can be
loaded directly from the land carrier onto the ship. Prior to the advent of this innovation,
the prevailing practice was to ship loose articles of cargo, which were handled piece by piece.
In loading ships, the longshoremen would unload cargo from the trucks, prepare it for loading
by arranging it on pallets and hoist it aboard ship. During off-loading, longshoremen would
remove the pallets from the ship and "break bulk" or sort the goods according to consignee
and type and then move the items to the end of the pier for loading onto trucks. 548 F.2d at
498. For a study of containerization and its effect on waterfront labor relations, see Ross,
Waterfront Labor Response to Technological Change: A Tale of Two Unions, 21 LAB. L. J.
397 (1970).
548 F.2d at 496.
ioId. A "full shipper's load" signifies a container fully loaded with goods from a single
shipper destined for a single owner-consignee. Id. at 496 n.8. Full shipper's loads should be
distinguished from "consolidated full container loads," which are containers holding goods
from more than one shipper. Id. at 498.
" The term "strip" refers to removing the goods from the container; "stuff" means to
pack them into the container. Id. at 496 n.9.
12 Id.
13 Id.

" The ILA collective bargaining agreements covering the Hampton Roads Longshoremen
for the years prior to 1968 did not contain any rules regarding the handling of containers or
their contents. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transport) No. 5-cc-791
(NLRB, Aug. 18, 1977) (to be reported at 231 N.L.R.B. No. 64), opinion of the Administrative
Law Judge at 5. During these years the longshoremen stripped containers holding less than
full shipper's loads. Full shipper's loads was not stripped unless requested by the consignee's
agent or the stevedore. As a rule, the longshoremen merely removed shipper's load containers
from the ship to the pier, where they were picked up by the motor carrier. Id. The 1968-1971
collective bargaining agreement dealt with containers for the first time and provided that
containers holding consolidated full loads (CFL) and less than trailer loads (LTL), if to be
stripped within a radius of 50 miles of the port center by employees other than those of the
"beneficial owner" of the cargo, were to be stripped by ILA labor. Id. at 6-7. No mention of
full shipper's loads were made in the 1968 contract. The 1971-1974 contract contained the
same container rules as found in the 1968 agreement, but three months after the signing of
the contract, representatives of the shipping industry and the ILA met to discuss the problem
of containerization. The meeting culminated in the Dublin Agreement which sought to interpret and clarify the rules on containers. The interpretation stated that the rules applied to
either LTL or CFL containers or "containers which come from or go to any person. . . who
is not a beneficial owner of the cargo and such containers which come from or go to any point
within the 50-mile zone." Id. at 8. The 1974 contract changed the language of the container
rules and incorporated the Dublin guidelines so as explicitly to entitle ILA labor to strip full
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Moreover, the carriers, trucking firms which provided land transportation
for cargo loaded and unloaded at the port, were not parties to the ILAHRSA collective bargaining agreement.'"
The event precipitating the controversy in Humphrey occurred when
several trucking firms stripped 6 full shipper's loads at their terminals
within the fifty mile zone. United States Lines, Inc., a member of HRSA
with whom the offending truckers were doing business, paid liquidated
damages to the union pursuant to the terms of the 1974 agreement and
sought reimbursement from the carriers. When the carriers refused to
make reimbursement, United States Lines cancelled its agreements with
these trucking firms. 7 The truckers then filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board charging that the container rules constituted
unlawful hot cargo agreements" and that the efforts of the ILA and HRSA
to enforce those rules amounted to an unlawful secondary boycott. 9 The
Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board or
NLRB) subsequently sought a temporary injunction from the federal district court under section 10(l) of the NLRA pending the Board's adjudication of the charges."'
The district court in Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's
Association' considered the charges that the container regulations and
their enforcement violated sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA,
concluded that the ILA objective was primary work preservation," and
denied injunctive relief.? The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated this
shipper's loads whenever such work is to be done within the 50-mile zone by employees other
than those of the consignee. Id. at 10-11.
'5 548 F.2d at 497 and n.14.
" See note 11 supra.
'7 Id. at 496-97.
" See note 4 supra.
" 548 F.2d at 495-96; see note 5 supra.
Section 10(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970) provides that whenever a person
is charged with engaging in an unfair labor practice under §§ 8(a), 8(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B) or (C),
or 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, a preliminary investigation of the matter shall be made by the
National Labor Relations Board. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney
of the Board to whom the matter has been referred is satisfied that there is "reasonable cause
to believe such charge is true" he must petition any United States district court within the
district where the unfair labor practice is alleged to have occurred or where the charged person
resides or transacts business for "appropriate injunctive relief" pending final adjudication of
the charges by the Board. The district courts are given jurisdiction to grant such injunctive
relief as they deem "just and proper". See, e.g., Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied
Garment Workers' Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1239-45 (2d Cir. 1974).
21 401 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Va. 1975), vacated and remanded, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.
1977).
" 401 F. Supp. at 1407. The district court also concluded that the eight year period
during which the longshoremen's claim of exclusive right to strip full shipper's loads was not
protected expressly by the collective bargaining agreement in force, see text accompanying
note 14 supra, did not extinguish the union's right to preserve that claim by contract. 401 F.
Supp. at 1407.
n Id. The district court reasoned that, historically, the traditional work of the longshoremen included the preparation of cargo items for loading and the sorting or break-bulk work
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order and remanded the case for entry of an appropriate injunction.24
The procedural context in which Humphrey came to the Fourth Circuit, an appeal from the district court's denial of a temporary injunction,
required the court's preliminary consideration of two distinct standards for
the exercise of judicial power. The court first examined the standard to be
applied by a district court in determining whether to grant or deny section
10(l) petitions for injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit had little difficulty
in concluding that "the function of the district court is . . . to determine
whether the Regional Director has reasonable cause to believe that the
respondents are violating the Act."" By adopting the "reasonable cause to
believe" standard, the Fourth Circuit rejected the NLRB's argument that
a district court must grant injunctive relief under section 10(l) whenever
the legal position of the Regional Director cannot be characterized as
"insubstantial and frivolous." 2 Although some circuit courts have sanctioned application of the latter test, the Fourth Circuit followed the weight
of authority and the better reasoned decisions in determining that the
more rigorous "reasonable cause to believe" standard should govern.2
The second standard which the Fourth Circuit had to consider is the
appropriate scope of appellate review in cases where section 10(l) injunctive relief has been denied by the district court. There is a conflict among
the circuits regarding whether a district court's finding of no reasonable
cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed is a
28
finding of fact or a conclusion of law subject to broad appellate review.
upon unloading. Id. at 1406. The court concluded that the container rules "were intended and
operated solely to preserve historical work practices," that "[r]e-acquisition and preservation" of traditional work is the purpose of the union's actions in enforcing the rules, and held
that the rules and their enforcement were lawful. Id. at 1407.
24 Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1977).
2 Id. at 497.
" The "insubstantial and frivolous" standard has been adopted by a minority of federal
circuit courts of appeal. See cases cited in Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
548 F.2d 494, 497 n.15 (4th Cir. 1977).
2' The most cogent opinion rejecting the "insubstantial and frivolous" standard is Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat Suit & Allied Garment Workers' Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1239-45
(2d Cir. 1974) (adoption of the "insubstantial and frivolous" standard would be an abandonment of traditional equitable discretion and would be unwarranted by either the language or
the legislative history of § 10(l). A majority of the circuits adhere to the more stringent
"reasonable cause to believe" standard. See, e.g., Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977); Danielson v. International Organization of Masters,
Mates & Pilots, 521 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1975); Sachs v. Local Union No. 48, Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., 454 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1972); Local Joint
Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1963); Cosentino v. Bhd.
of Carpenters, 265 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1959); AFTRA v. Getreau, 258 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1958).
21The standard of review for section 10(l) petitions for injunctive relief is not uniform
among the circuit courts. Some of the circuits have stated that the standard of review is
limited to whether the district court findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Squillacote v.
Graphic Arts Int'l. Union Local 277, 513 F.2d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 1975); Newspaper Guild v.
Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1969); Local Joint Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1963); Schauffler v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 292 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1961); AFTRA v. Getreau, 258 F.2d 698, 699 (6th Cir. 1958).
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While several circuits have held that such a finding is a question of fact,
reversable only if clearly erroneous, other circuits have held that the finding is made as a question of law and subject to broad appellate review.
The Fourth Circuit, however, refused to adopt either standard noting that
"appellant would be entitled to reversal under either standard." 9
Having established the procedural framework of the Humphrey case,
the court then proceeded to discuss the substantive issue presented:
whether the container regulations included in the ILA-HRSA collective
bargaining agreement constituted valid work preservation measures or illegal work acquisition attempts." The Fourth Circuit briefly examined the
history of containerization in the Hampton Roads area,31 and defined the
traditional work of the longshoremen as that of loading and unloading the
cargo of ships at piers in the port area. 2 While recognizing that the longshoremen traditionally unpacked and sorted all cargo items in break-bulk
fashion," the court noted that during the 1965-1967 period, when there
were no rules regarding containerized cargo, the general practice with regard to full shipper's loads was for the longshoremen simply to place the
container on the pier to be picked up by the motor carrier. The court
viewed the work in controversy as that of stripping full shipper's loads
within the fifty mile zone and observed that throughout the 1965-1974
period the truckers picking up these containers had "often" taken them
to their port area terminals and stripped them. Finally, the court noted
that there was no express provision giving ILA labor the exclusive right to
strip or stuff full shipper's loads until the 1974 collective bargaining agreement.3 Thus, the court concluded that the stripping and stuffing of these
containers was not part of the traditional work of the longshoremen of
loading and unloading the cargo of ships. Relying on the Second Circuit's
decision in InternationalLongshoremen's Association v. NLRB (Consolidated Express), 35 the court further concluded that this work was traditionally the work of the trucking firms' employees and thus, the container rules
Other circuits have held that the district court's determination of "reasonable cause to believe" is a question of law subject to full appellate review under the abuse of discretion
standard. See, e.g., Danielson v. Joint Bd.of Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers' Union,
494 F.2d 1230, 1244 (2d Cir. 1974); Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778,
789 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fourth Circuit has not chosen either standard of review. Humphrey
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494, 500 n.24 (4th Cir. 1977); Malone v.
United Steelworkers of America, 432 F.2d 554, 555 (4th Cir. 1970) (grant of injunctive relief
"not 'clearly erroneous' nor was there abuse of discretion").
2 548 F.2d at 500 n.24.
11The Fourth Circuit made no attempt to resolve finally this ultimate question in the
case. Rather, the court at this preliminary stage examined the issue solely for the purpose of
determining whether the Regional Director had reasonable cause to believe that the agreement constituted an unfair labor practice. Id. at 497.
11Id. at 498-99.
= Id. at 498.

1 Id.; see note 8 supra.
11 548 F.2d at 498-99.

11537 F.2d 706 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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were unlawful work acquisition measures. 8
In reaching this conclusion the Fourth Circuit correctly enunciated the
rule of substantive law, established by the Supreme Court in National
Woodwork ManufacturersAssociation v. NLRB,37 which governs cases involving the validity of purported work preservation clauses. In National
Woodwork, the Court held that primary work preservation agreements,"
whose objective is the preservation of work traditionally done by employees
of the bargaining unit, do not violate section 8(e) of the NLRA. The Supreme Court phrased the test as whether, "under all of the surrounding
circumstances,"39 the union's objective was preservation of the work for its
members or whether the agreement was "tactically calculated to satisfy
union objectives elsewhere.""0 The Court in Woodwork, however, did not
decide the permissibility of union action aimed at acquiring new job tasks
when the traditional jobs of the workers are not threatened. This reservation has given rise to a consistent line of decisions by the Board and the
Circuit Courts denying the protection of the work preservation doctrine to
so-called "work acquisition" measures.
The task of differentiating lawful work preservation measures from
impermissible work acquisition activities is difficult, however, in situa11548 F.2d at 499-500.
31 See note 7 supra; see also Comment, Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation,77
YALE L. J. 1401 (1968).

u 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Woodwork involved a contractor on a housing project who was
party to a collective bargaining agreement which contained a provision whereby the contractor agreed that union members would not handle pre-machined doors. The contractor nevertheless ordered such doors from a member of the Woodwork Manufacturer's Association.
When the union ordered its members not to hang the doors, the contractor yielded to the
union's demands and substituted the customary "blank" doors which were to be cut and
fitted on the jobsite. 386 U.S. at 615-16. The Association then filed charges against the union
claiming that the "will not handle" agreement violated § 8(e) of the NLRA and that the
union's enforcement of the agreement was in derogation of the § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) ban on secondary boycotts. Id. The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges, adopting the
Trial Examiner's conclusion that since the "will not handle" agreement was designed to
preserve the traditional work of the carpenters, the agreement and the union's efforts to
enforce it were primary activity outside the prohibitions of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 149
NLRB 646, 657, 57 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1964). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
disputed provision violated § 8(e) without regard to whether the objective was primary or
secondary. 354 F.2d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 1965). The court of appeals was, in turn, reversed by
the Supreme Court. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
11386 U.S. at 644 n.38. The Court suggested that such circumstances might include the
history of labor relations between the union and the employers to be boycotted, the
"remoteness of the threat of displacement" by the prohibited product or services, and the
"economic personality of the industry." Id.
40Id. at 644. Thus, a perfectly valid work preservation agreement can give rise to an
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation if the union's enforcement of the clause has a secondary objective.
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951) (it is not necessary
to find that the unlawful secondary objective is the sole objective of the activity in question
in order to find an unfair labor practice); George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323,
327 (4th Cir. 1973) (valid work preservation clauses remain available for appropriate application but by undue extension can lead to violations of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).

1978]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

tions where recent technological innovations have generated a gradual erosion in the availability of the traditional job tasks of employees,' or where
such changes have altered the traditional tasks themselves.42 Some courts
have phrased the work preservation doctrine in terms of "fairly claimable"
work, 3 a standard which has been interpreted to include jobs of the type
traditionally performed by employees. In the leading "work recapture"
case, American Boiler Manufacturers Association v. NLRB,44 the Eighth
Circuit held that a collective bargaining agreement which seeks to preserve
work currently being performed by unit employees and to recapture work
lost due to technological advances is not in violation of section 8(e) of the
NLRA and that the union can enforce the agreement where the objective
is to affect the labor relations of the employer with whom they have the
agreement. 5 The court chose not to determine whether a work preservation
clause can be enforced where "the objective is to acquire work which unit
employees had never performed or work which they may have performed
in the past but have completely lost before the clause was negotiated."4
In a case with similar facts, George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB,47 the
Fourth Circuit reached a contrary result. The court reasoned that since the
subcontractor-employer was required by contract specifications to install
prefabricated pipe on the jobsite, he did not have control over the assignment of this work to his employees. Although such piping was in violation
of a valid work preservation agreement between the subcontractor and his
employees, the employer could comply with the union members' refusal to
install the piping only by terminating his business with the general con" See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967): George Koch
Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NLRB,
404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Retail Clerks' Union, Local
648, 171 N.L.R.B. 1018, 68 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1968).
,1See, e.g., Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.
1977); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB (Consolidated Express), 537 F.2d 706 (2d
Cir. 1976).
" The "fairly claimable" standard for work preservation agreements and activity originated in Meat and Highway Drivers, Local 710 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Chicago truck drivers negotiated work preservation clause that required all interstate shipnents of meat to be turned over to local drivers at Chicago terminals. The court found that
a dramatic change in the location of meat packing plants from inside Chicago to areas outside
the city had resulted in a loss of 75% of jobs for local drivers and concluded that the jobs
were fairly claimable because the union activity involved recapture of work lost through
relocation of plants). See also, Local 223, Sheet Metals Workers Int'l. Ass'n v. NLRB, 498
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Canada Dry Corp. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1970). The
National Labor Relations Board also has embraced the "fairly claimable" standard. Local
282, Teamsters, 197 N.L.R.B. 673, 677, 80 L.R.R.M. 1632 (1972) ( §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
do not prohibit agreements or conduct "aimed at recapturing or reclaiming for unit employees
work which they previously performed or which otherwise constitutes 'fairly claimable'
work"). See, Note, A RationalApproach to Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation,57
VA. L. Rav. 1280, 1305-08 (1971).
" 404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
" Id. at 552 & n.10.
6 Id. at 552.
" 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973).
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tractor.48 Thus, the court held that the union's conduct constituted an
illegal secondary boycott. 9
The treatment by the courts of longshore labor activity directed at
recapturing work lost to the longshoremen through the increased use of
containerized cargo is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in
InternationalLongshoremen's Association v. NLRB (Consolidated
Express).50 The court sustained the Board's conclusion that the container
agreement between the ILA and the New York Shipping Association and
subsequent efforts by the ILA to enforce that agreement violated the hot
cargo' and secondary boycott provisions of sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the NLRA.52 The court ruled that the work preservation doctrine does
not protect union efforts to obtain job tasks which are not currently performed by union members and which, as a result of technological change,
have diverted traditional work functions. Consolidated Express involved
an ILA claim to the work of stuffing and stripping consolidated full shipper's loads, 3 work which was then being performed by firms which had
long been engaged in the container consolidation business. The court concluded that since the consolidating firms had long done this work, it was
no longer part of the traditional work of the longshoremen. 4
Despite superficial similarities, the situation presented in Humphrey
v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association5 stands in marked contrast
to that in Consolidated Express. The work in controversy is not that of
packing consolidated container loads, but the stripping of full shipper's
loads" in contravention of container rules expressed in the 1974 collective
11Id. at 327-28. This "right to control" test has been used by the Board to determine
the legality of union actions in the secondary activity context. In brief, if the employer being
pressured by the union has the right to control work assignments, the pressure is presumptively legal; if he cannot control the assignment of the work in dispute, as where he has
contracted with another party under terms that preclude this right, then the union activity
is presumptively illegal. Most of the circuits that have considered the test since Woodwork
have rejected it as in conflict with the "all the surrounding circumstances" test of Woodwork.
See 62 VA. L. REV. 634, 635 n.5 (1976). The Board has continued to use this test in determining
whether union activity has an unlawful secondary objective, and the Supreme Court recently
has approved the test as a proper consideration among "all the surrounding circumstances."
See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
1g490 F.2d at 327-28.
10537 F.2d 706 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
51 See note 4 supra.
52 29 U.S.C. § 158(e), (b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970). See notes 2 & 3 supra.
537 F.2d at 709. In this respect, Consolidated Express presented the inverse of the
situation in Humphrey v. ILA, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977). In Humphrey, the longshoremen
had the work of stripping and stuffing consolidated shipper's loads and were seeking to assert
their claim to exclusively handle full shipper's loads.
11 537 F.2d at 712. The court defined the traditional work of the longshoremen as that of
loading and unloading ships and concluded that the on-pier stripping and stuffing of full
shipper's loads "as an incident of" the unloading of ships did not include the packing of
consolidated container loads. Id.
548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977).
" See note 10 supra.

1978]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

bargaining agreement. Even if these rules were not explicitly set forth until
the 1974 agreement, there is substantial evidence that the ILA claim to this
work was recognized in past agreements and practices." In this connection,
there is little evidence to recommend the view that the longshoremen
abandoned the handling of full shipper's loads,58 a claim that the Second
Circuit rejected in Consolidated Express in the face of a clearer evidence
to that effect.59 Moreover, in Humphrey there was no existing group like
the consolidators in ConsolidatedExpress who could assert a strong claim
that the handling of full shipper's loads was their "traditional -work."
Instead, there were only trucking firms who engaged in sporadic stripping
for reasons of mere convenience and economy" and in violation of the
container rules. Although the ultimate effect of the enforcement of the
rules regarding full shipper's loads was to prevent the trucking firms from
handling these containers," it was not the goal of the ILA to preclude these
employers from handling containerized .cargo. The objective of the ILA was
to enforce the rules in order to preserve work which was being lost through
the inroads of containerization. This goal appears to be squarely within the
protection of the Woodwork doctrine, despite incidental effects on those
truckers who refused to abide by the rules in force between the ILA and
the HRSA.12 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on ConsolidatedExpress
seems misplaced. Nonetheless, a subsequent decision by the NLRB that
the container rules at issue in Humphrey violated sections 8(e) and
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA, 3 confirms the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
1

548 F.2d at 499 n.19.
Is The fact that a period of eight years ensued between the advent of containerization
and the express assertion of the ILA claim to the full container load work in the 1974 agreement was not seen as precluding the claim by the district court. "The newness of...
containerization, coupled with the adjustment time needed by all the industries affected...
must be expected to create temporary maladjustments in the legal agreements of the affected
parties." Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 1401, 1407 (E.D.
Va. 1975).
5, 537 F.2d 706, 712 (2nd Cir. 1976).
548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977).
6 Id. at 497 & n.14.
Under the "all of the surrounding circumstances" test of Woodwork, see text accompanying notes 39 & 40 supra, there is nothing to indicate that the ILA objective was anything
but primary work preservation.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir.
1973), held that a secondary boycott was shown where the only course of action open for the
immediate employer of the striking employees was to cease doing business with the boycotted
employer supplying the banned product. In Humphrey, however, the shippers were not pressured to cease dealing with the truckers, but merely to comply with the container rules. The
trucking firms were only precluded from "stripping" and "stuffing" container cargo when
they refused to reimburse the shippers for fines incurred by the latter when the truckers
violated the container rules.
No. 5-cc-791
62 See International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transport),
(N.L.R.B., Aug. 18, 1977) (slip opinion indicates that case will be officially reported at 231
N.L.R.B. No. 64); 96 L.R.R.M. 1636 (1977). A divided Board adopted the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that the container rules violated § 8(e) of the NLRA and that the union's
efforts to enforce the rules against U.S. Lines violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.

